Abstract: Critics argue that the -fair value‖ provisions in U.S. accounting rules exacerbated the recent financial crisis by depleting banks' regulatory capital, which curtailed lending and triggered asset sales, leading to further economic turmoil. Defenders counter-argue that the role of fair value in U.S. accounting rules is insufficient to lead to the pro-cyclical effects alleged by the critics; they point out that most bank assets are not fair valued, and the assets that are fair valued likely have little effect on regulatory capital, especially when banks do not intend to sell the assets at low prices. Our empirical evidence indicates that fair value provisions in U.S. accounting rules did not affect the commercial banking industry in the ways commonly alleged by critics. We show that fair value accounting losses had minimal effect on regulatory capital, and there is no evidence of increased selling of securities during the crisis. a Corresponding author
I. Introduction
U.S. accounting rules, which are the basis of bank regulatory capital requirements, have been blamed for exacerbating the recent financial crisis. Critics allege that the rules required financial institutions to write down their assets to abnormally low market prices even when the institutions did not intend to sell at those prices; they argue that these write-downs decreased banks' regulatory capital, forcing them to take actions that lead to further rounds of price declines and capital depletions. Defenders of U.S. accounting and bank regulatory systems counter-argue that the fair value accounting provisions are limited and are unlikely to have lead to the pro-cyclical effects alleged by the critics. Defenders point out that most bank assets are not fair valued, and the assets that are fair valued likely have little effect on regulatory capital, especially when banks do not intend to sell the assets at low prices.
Our empirical evidence indicates that fair value accounting did not affect the commercial banking industry in the ways commonly alleged by critics. There are two primary aspects of our analyses. First, we quantify the effects of fair value losses on regulatory capital. Typically the largest asset on bank balance sheets subject to fair value accounting is the portfolio of debt securities that are classified as available-for-sale (AFS) or held-to-maturity (HTM). Fair value losses on these securities do not affect regulatory capital unless management deems them -other than temporary,‖ meaning that the bank cannot demonstrate intent and ability to hold the securities until the price recovers. During the crisis, the banking industry claimed that demonstrating such intent and ability was too onerous, causing -performing assets that have no credit losses [to be] written down as impaired,‖ thus needlessly reducing regulatory capital and restricting the ability to lend (American Bankers Association 2008) . Based on these claims, Congress pressured the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), to make swift changes that softened the rules governing other-than-temporary-impairments (OTTIs). In light of the link between OTTI charges and regulatory capital, the banking industry's complaints about OTTIs, and the subsequent rule changes, we examine the size, timing, and pro-cyclical effects of the OTTI charges taken by a sample of bank holding companies since 2004.
Our second set of empirical analyses focus on the common allegation that banks boost their regulatory capital ratios by selling assets, which shrinks the ratio's denominator (riskweighted assets). Selling assets in response to fair value losses such as OTTI charges would further decrease market prices, resulting in more rounds of write-downs, capital depletion, and asset selling. In this way, fair value accounting would make initial exogenous shocks to asset prices worse than is justified by fundamentals. Several analytical models rely on asset sales to generate the pro-cyclical effects of fair value accounting (Cifuentes et al. 2005; Allen and Carletti 2008; Plantin et al. 2008 ). These models typically assume a pure fair value accounting regime in which all asset price declines reduce accounting earnings and regulatory capital.
Academic studies, popular press accounts, and trade groups allege that U.S. accounting rules and, by extension, regulatory capital rules were sufficiently reliant on fair value to prompt pro-cyclical selling behavior, which worsened the recent crisis. These arguments were cited in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) deliberations and in Congressional hearings that pressured the FASB to change U.S. accounting rules. However, as Laux and Leuz (hereafter LL) 2010) point out, there is no systematic evidence concerning whether banks do, in fact, sell assets in response to write-downs or low capital ratios. We examine banks' selling behavior during the crisis, consistent with calls by Laux and Leuz for research to be -specific about the links through which write-downs under fair value can create problems,‖ and -more explicit about the mechanism of contagion‖ (Laux and Leuz 2009, 833) .
Our sample consists of 150 bank holding companies with large portfolios of nonTreasury AFS and HTM securities. We conduct industry-and firm-level analyses. On the industry level, we find no support for claims that the fair value provisions of U.S. accounting rules significantly depleted regulatory capital or caused pro-cyclical selling of securities. OTTI charges reached levels during the crisis that were likely unprecedented, but these charges had only a small impact on regulatory capital, especially compared to the impact of bad debt expense which is a not a fair valued item. Furthermore, most of the OTTI charges were not recognized until late in the crisis, well after the financial markets deteriorated and capital ratios began to fall.
We do not observe an increase in industry-level sales of AFS and HTM securities as alleged by some critics of fair value accounting; sales of AFS and HTM securities during the crisis were in line with the levels seen before the crisis. Also, we find no evidence that banks more commonly sold securities at a loss during the crisis, providing no support for claims that fair value losses caused -fire-sales‖ of assets.
We find mixed evidence of pro-cyclical activity at the firm level. We seek evidence as to whether bank stress factors such as low capital ratios or low earnings cause banks to sell securities. Our results suggest that, consistent with the notion of pro-cyclicality, sales of securities are correlated with the magnitude of OTTI charges and with decreases in capital ratios.
On the other hand, inconsistent with the notion of pro-cyclicality, sales of securities are not significantly related to other components of earnings. Furthermore, we find some evidence that firms with low capital ratios actually engage in less selling than do firms with high capital ratios.
We also seek evidence regarding whether bank stress factors lead banks to sell assets at fire-sale prices. Again there is inconsistent evidence of pro-cyclical behavior; net losses realized on sales of securities are statistically significantly correlated with the capital ratio in some specifications but the correlations between net losses realized on sales and all other stress factors are not statistically significant in the predicted directions.
Further evidence against pro-cyclicality is that there is less interrelated selling activity among banks during the crisis. Specifically, before the crisis, industry-level security sales are a significant determinant of sales by individual banks, but, during the crisis, industry-level sales cease to be a significant determinant. Also, the coefficient of variation in securities sales across banks significantly increases during the crisis. This higher variation in selling across banks is counter to the notion that U.S. accounting rules are pro-cyclical inasmuch as they force banks to uniformly respond to a single set of market conditions.
In the next section, we explain the concerns about fair value accounting and pro-cyclical asset sales, and recent rule changes. Section 3 describes the sample. Section 4 describes our research design and findings. Section 5 concludes.
II. Background Arguments regarding fair value accounting and cyclicality
There are two arguments that support the notion that fair value provisions in U.S. accounting rules worsened the recent financial crisis. One argument is based on the premise that, during the crisis, market prices were poor indicators of the long run value of certain assets (principally mortgage-backed securities). Even though the securities were fundamentally sound and banks had no intention of selling them at low prices, they were forced to write them down, leading to decreases in regulatory capital that did not reflect fundamentals. Thus, fundamentally healthy banks were forced to curtail their lending activities because of misleadingly low regulatory capital, extending what began as a weakness in subprime mortgage-backed securities to the broader economy. In lobbying to reform the OTTI rules (which eventually proved successful), the American Bankers Association describes the problem as follows:
-One key factor that is recognized as having exacerbated these problems is fair value accounting, which influences the recognition of OTTI. In today's illiquid market the results can be severe: (1) capital is artificially eroded despite solid fundamental credit performance, (2) the lending capability of a bank is reduced as much as $13 for every $1 of needless OTTI, and (3) the accounting formula is driving economic outcomesincluding reduced availability of consumer and small business credit, with a negative impact on the health of individual institutions -and does not reflect economic reality.‖ (American Bankers Association 2008) To assess the role of OTTI charges in the financial crisis, we examine their size and timing relative to other non-fair value charges that were taken by banks.
A key assumption of this first argument regarding the effects of fair value accounting is that the fundamental values of the assets were sound and that banks would shield themselves from market price declines by holding the securities and collecting the underlying cash flows in the long run. If this assumption does not hold (i.e., if the securities were not fundamentally sound and banks would not be able to recover the losses), fair value accounting cannot be blamed for causing an unjustified decline in lending. To the contrary, fair value accounting improves economic efficiency by speeding recognition that capital reserves are inadequate to support further lending.
Another argument regarding the pro-cyclical effects of fair value accounting holds even if the initial fair value losses reflect fundamentals. This argument holds that after the fair value losses are taken to reflect exogenous fundamental shocks to asset prices, banks sell assets in an attempt to boost the capital ratio. This selling pressure reduces market prices below fundamentals. The fair value accounting rules then force banks to write assets down to belowfundamental values, resulting in unwarranted capital depletion and even further rounds of selling and price decreases.
The essence of this second argument is found in the theoretical models in the academic literature. These models usually assume a pure fair value accounting regime and less than perfectly liquid markets. In Cifuentes et al. (2005) , banks, in response to fair value losses that reduce regulatory capital, sell assets to reduce the denominator of their capital ratios (riskweighted assets); this reduces prices even further because of less than perfect liquidity. In Allen and Carletti (2008) , fair value losses cause banks to be declared insolvent by regulators, resulting in forced liquidations that reduce market prices even further because of less than perfect liquidity. Both of these models suggest that, in response to fair value losses, selling of all types of risky assets increases. In contrast, Plantin et al. (2008) predict that banks increase selling of the very assets that have declined in value. Their model does not rely on capital shortages to produce pro-cyclical asset sales. Instead, the model assumes that managers are concerned with the effects of fair value losses on reported earnings. In response to an exogenous negative shock to an asset price, managers race to be among the first to sell the asset early in the asset's price decline, flooding the market with supply and causing prices to fall below fundamental values.
Even though U.S. accounting and bank regulatory rules are not as fair value oriented as the regimes assumed in these models, critics have made similar claims about how U.S. rules promoted pro-cyclical sales of assets during the recent crisis. Academic papers making this claim include Hellwig (2009, 176) and Bignon et al. (2009, 4) . Bignon et al. (2009) go so far as to claim that -a consensus exists on the role of fair-value measurements in spreading the crisis throughout the whole of the financial system: some entities urgently sold their assets to obtain the liquidities required to respond to their accounting write downs, creating the mechanism by which the crisis was amplified.‖ Numerous popular press accounts also make this claim, including Hall (2008) , Kewelramani (2008 ), The Economist (2008 , and Wesbury and Stein (2009) . The Economist describes the problem as follows:
-Regulators and bankers fear that this ‗mark-to-market' approach is helping to turn a liquidity crisis into a solvency one. As holders of mortgage-backed securities and the like revalue their assets at fire-sale prices, they are running short of capital-which can lead to further sales and more write-downs. Are the beancounters ensuring a crash?‖ (The Economist 2008,13).
The claim that U.S. rules promoted pro-cyclical sales of assets during the crisis was also part of the lobbying and policy deliberations surrounding fair value accounting reforms. A significant portion of the Mortgage Bankers Association's comment letter to the SEC describes -[Some panelists] assert that when asset prices decline and liquidity is reduced, banks are forced to sell their investments or raise capital (due to the interaction of regulatory capital requirements that are based on the fair value of their assets). If bank portfolios are marked-to-market, their capital position deteriorates, which, in turn, causes more asset sales and further depresses asset prices‖ (SEC 2008, 149 -When the price of assets in a bank's balance sheet are written down, the bank has to raise additional capital by selling additional assets or stock. These sales put more downward pressure on prices and so it is this negative feedback loop that is exacerbated by the combination of accounting practices and capital requirements‖ (Garrett 2009 (FAF 2010, 14) .
rules, especially rules pertaining to fair value. Subsequently, Congress debated various forms of legislation that would create a systemic risk regulator that has the power to change accounting rules when they are deemed to threaten financial stability (Lamoreaux 2009 have to sell the debt securities before the price recovers (FSP FAS 115-2 and 124-2, paragraph 7), thus enabling firms to avoid OTTI charges more often.
The FASB staff position's second OTTI rule change reduces the impact on regulatory capital even when OTTI charges are necessary. Under the old rule, the size of the OTTI loss was the difference between the security's fair value and amortized cost, and the entire loss was recognized in net income and flowed to retained earnings where it affected regulatory capital.
Under the new rule, only the -credit‖ portion of the loss (i.e. that related to expected nonrecoverable cash flows) is recognized in net income and retained earnings (FSP FAS 115-2 and 124-2, paragraphs 8-9). The non-credit portion of the loss, which reflects illiquidity discounts that the bank will avoid if it holds on to the asset, is recognized in -accumulated other comprehensive income.‖ Many items in this account, including the non-credit portion of OTTI charges, are excluded from regulatory capital (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2010, p. HC-R-2). In summary, changes to the accounting standards allow firms to make more optimistic fair value estimates, and avoid or reduce charges to earnings and regulatory capital even when the optimistic estimates indicate losses.
Prior empirical studies on the role of fair value accounting in the crisis
Despite the controversy surrounding fair value accounting, there are relatively few studies that empirically examine its role in the crisis. Khan (2009) analyzes how the extreme negative stock returns of individual banks co-vary with those of money-center banks. He finds that the negative returns co-vary more strongly during times when more items are measured at fair value, suggesting that fair value accounting contributes to contagion. Bowen et al. (2010) find that the stock market reacted positively (negatively) to key events signaling that policymakers would (would not) relax fair value accounting rules.
Rather than making inferences from stock returns, which reflect the perceived effects of fair value accounting, other studies examine the direct impact of fair value accounting on banks' financial condition. As part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Congress required the SEC to examine the role of fair value accounting in the crisis. The SEC examined a sample of fifty financial institutions that failed during the crisis and concluded that fair value accounting did not play a meaningful role in the failures (SEC 2008) . The primary basis for this conclusion is that the failed banks had a minority of assets whose fair value losses affected regulatory capital, and even for the banks that did report sizeable fair value losses, the failures appeared to stem from credit losses related to poor lending decisions rather than from marking assets to market. argue that securities classified as -trading,‖ which constitute about 12 percent of the assets of large banks, are the only fair valued assets that could have significantly affected regulatory capital. However, LL point out that even the American Bankers Association believes that trading securities should be fair valued because they are intended to be sold at market prices within short horizons.
Our study more closely examines the fair value effects of the AFS and HTM securities portfolio because declines in the portfolio's fair value can affect regulatory capital if deemed other than temporary. These OTTI charges merit further study because of allegations that the charges were excessive and pro-cyclical, leading the FASB to change the OTTI rules. Shaffer (2010) also examines OTTI charges and pro-cyclical actions taken by a small sample (fourteen) of large bank holding companies in 2008. He finds that the impact of the OTTI charges on regulatory capital was negligible for most of the banks, and finds little evidence of distressed sales and other pro-cyclical behavior.
Our study examines more banks over a longer time period, allowing us to compare activity during the crisis to that under more normal circumstances. It also allows us to determine whether pro-cyclical behavior was occurring in 2007 as the crisis built momentum (Ryan 2008) .
To measure sales of securities, Shaffer (2010) uses "AFS and HTM net portfolio inflows/outflows," which closely mirrors the change in the AFS and HTM portfolio's amortized cost. This measure, however, hides pro-cyclical selling activity in cases where banks sell risky securities and use the proceeds to purchase riskless securities like Treasuries. Instead, we collect a more direct measure of securities sales from the statement of cash flows found in the SEC forms 10Q and 10K; this measure is not affected by purchases.
III. Sample Selection
Our sample consists of 150 bank holding companies that are among the largest holders of non-Treasury AFS and HTM securities as of June 30, 2006. We form the sample just before the first public signs of distress in the banking industry, which Ryan (2008) traces to February 2007 when two subprime mortgage originators announced major increases in loss reserves. We identify the banks using Federal Reserve Y-9C reports filed by bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of at least $500 million. To form the sample we first rank all report filers by the amortized cost of their portfolio of non-Treasury AFS and HTM securities. We use the portfolio's amortized cost instead of fair value because amortized cost reflects the notional amount of risky securities that are subject to OTTI charges and available to sell. We require banks to regularly file forms 10-Q and 10-K with the SEC because we use the filings to handcollect OTTI charges and sales of securities. We further require that the bank file both the Y-9C 
IV. Research design and results

Other-than-temporary-impairments
Since the Y-9C report combines OTTI charges with realized gains and losses on securities sales, we hand-collect quarterly OTTI charges on AFS and HTM securities from 10-Qs Adjusting the Tier 1 capital ratio for OTTI increases the median slightly, from 9.9 to 10.0 percent. The increase in the mean is larger, from 10.5 to 10.8, suggesting that the effect of OTTI is concentrated in a small number of banks. On the other hand, the effect of abnormal bad debt expense on capital ratios is considerably larger. Abnormal bad debt expense moves the median capital ratio from 9.9 to 10.7 and the mean from 10.5 to 11.4. The similar magnitude of the shifts in the median and mean capital ratio indicate that the capital depletion caused by abnormal bad debt expense is relatively uniform across banks. To the extent that a credit crisis was caused by accounting-based reductions of regulatory capital, the -as if‖ adjustments to capital ratios indicate that the crisis was caused primarily by an accounting item that is not fair valued. 6 For simplicity, the -as if‖ computations only adjust the numerator of the capital ratio. OTTI and bad debt expense can also affect the denominator (risk-weighted assets), but we find that including denominator adjustments has almost no effect on the -as if‖ capital ratios. OTTI affects denominators because it reduces the amortized cost of the AFS and HTM securities in the denominator. Adjusting the denominator for OTTI is not as simple as adding back the OTTI amount because the OTTI may have applied to securities that were risk-weighted at more or less than 100 percent. When we add back OTTI to both the numerator and the denominator assuming that the applicable
Selling of AFS and HTM securities
Patterns of selling before and during the crisis
To determine whether banks engage in pro-cyclical selling of assets, we focus on the portfolio of AFS and HTM securities because this portfolio is typically the second largest asset on banks' balance sheets and consists of relatively liquid securities (LL 2010). We do not examine held-for-investment loans, the largest asset class on bank balance sheets, because they are not liquid. 7 Banks' most liquid risky assets are trading securities, but we do not examine these because they are intended to be sold in the short run; U.S. accounting rules would cause pro-cyclical sales of assets only if they cause banks to sell assets that would not otherwise have been sold. and HTM securities (labeled -constant sample size‖). Additionally, we plot total selling for a securities had a 100 percent weighting, the mean (median) -as if‖ capital ratio stays at 10.8 (10.0) as reported above. Large bad debt expenses can affect the denominator because banks are allowed to reduce the denominator by the amount of the allowance for loan loss that exceeds 1.25 percent of gross risk-weighted assets. To adjust for this denominator effect, we add back the lesser of abnormal bad debt expense and excess allowance for loan loss (item bhckA222 of the Y-9C report). After adjusting both the denominator and numerator for abnormal bad debt expense, the mean (median) -as if‖ capital ratio is 11.3 (10.7), compared to 11.4 (10.7) when only the numerator is adjusted. 7 Consistent with banks being unable to sell held-for-investment loans, during the sample period we observe few transfers of loans and leases from the held-for-investment to held-for-sale categories. During 2007 and 2008 only 13 of the 150 banks make such transfers. The total amount transferred during these years is $14.5 billion, representing only 0.3 percent of sample banks' total loans and leases held for investment at the beginning of 2007. 8 Compustat contains a version of this variable but it is often aggregated with cash from maturities of investments even though the two are presented separately on the bank's published statement of cash flows. We aggregate maturities with sales of securities only when they are aggregated on the published cash flow statement (12 banks). 9 The realized gains/losses from the Y-9C report include OTTI charges even though these losses are unrealized. Using our hand-collected OTTI information, we add back the OTTI charges to the realized gains/losses to compute the gain/loss realized on actual sales.
sample that consists of the same firms each quarter (labeled -constant sample firms‖). In order to increase the number of firms that can be used, we start this graph in 2005. Also, we plot total selling across all observations each quarter. Because the sample size for this last plot varies by quarter, we scale by average liabilities (labeled -scaled by average liabilities‖). Liabilities are used instead of assets because fewer liabilities are measured at fair value, meaning that they are a more stable scalar in times of changing market prices. The scaling is done on a value-weighted basis across firms i=1 to N in each quarter q:
(1)
Throughout the paper we use the suffix -_I‖ to denote industry-level variables that are scaled on a value-weighted basis as shown above.
[PLACE FIGURE 3 HERE] All three graphs in Figure 3 Thus, it is possible that during the crisis banks started selling more risky securities and fewer riskless securities compared to the past, masking an inter-temporal increase in sales of risky securities. To investigate this possibility, we examine holdings of Treasury securities, nonagency mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and all other AFS and HTM securities over time.
Holdings are measured using amortized cost, so they are unaffected by all fair value adjustments except those for OTTI. [
PLACE FIGURE 4 HERE]
Multiple regression analyses of sales before and during the crisis
In this sub-section we, first, use multiple regression analysis to determine whether The industry-level quarterly analyses conducted thus far give more weight to large sellers or holders of HTM and AFS securities, which seems appropriate because the activity of the largest players would affect market prices most. However, we now re-run regression (2) using firm-level quarterly observations in order to determine whether the non-cyclical behavior of the largest banks is masking pro-cyclical behavior among smaller banks. We scale firm-quarter securities sales, changes in Treasury holdings, and portfolio size by firm i's average liabilities in quarter q and winsorize at one percent (these variables are denoted SALES, CH_TREASURY, and PORTFOLIO_SIZE, respectively). Descriptive statistics for these and other firm-quarter variables used later are found in Table 2 . As in the industry-level quarterly regression, the 2007 and 2008 year indicator variables are not statistically significantly different from zero (see second column of Table 1 ). The estimates of the coefficients on the CH_TREASURY and PORTFOLIO_SIZE controls are statistically significantly different from zero in the expected directions.
Cross-sectional determinants of selling of HTM and AFS securities
We next examine the cross-sectional determinants of securities selling. In particular, we are interested in whether bank stress factors such as low capital ratios lead the banks to sell securities. The capital ratio plays a crucial role in theoretical models of pro-cyclicality; faced with negative shocks to the numerator of the ratio (the balance of regulatory capital) banks sell assets to shrink the denominator (risk-weighted assets). Therefore, we predict an inverse relation between securities sales and the beginning Tier 1 capital ratio (CAPITAL_RATIO). Similarly, we predict an inverse relation between securities sales and the prior quarter's change in capital ratio (ΔCAPITAL_RATIO) because recent capital ratio declines may prompt banks to sell securities. We use the change in capital ratio during the prior quarter because securities sales endogenously boost capital ratios during the current quarter. We include the bank's quarterly pre-tax net income scaled by average liabilities (EARNINGS) in order to capture exogenous shocks to the capital ratio within the quarter, which would prompt sales of assets. EARNINGS is the summary measure of performance that would cause the capital ratio to change during the quarter absent sales of assets. Given the potentially important role of OTTI charges and bad debt expenses in pro-cyclical selling, we exclude them from EARNINGS and include separate variables (denoted OTTI and BDE). 11 We also include as controls CH_TREASURY,
PORTFOLIO_SIZE, and the natural log of average liabilities (FIRM_SIZE). The regression model is as follows:
11 To compute EARNINGS, we take pre-tax earnings before extraordinary items, remove OTTI and BDE, and then add extraordinary items, even though extraordinary items is an after-tax amount. Since OTTI and BDE are pre-tax amounts and are of most interest, we consider it best to base the computation on a pre-tax earnings number. Table 2 ). Inconsistent with pro-cyclical sales of securities, mean and median SALES are lower during the crisis, although this difference does not remain significant in the multiple regression results reported in Table 1 . As expected, during the crisis CAPITAL_RATIO and EARNINGS are lower, and BDE and OTTI are higher. When compared to the pre-crisis period, the crisis-period mean BDE increases by a factor of 4 and mean OTTI increases by a factor of 20. 0.204); hence, we use multiple regression to examine the relation between securities sales and capital ratios after controlling for portfolio size. to capital-depleting accounting charges, EARNINGS and BDE also should be significantly related to SALES. Thus, there is inconsistent evidence that accounting charges lead to procyclical sales of assets. There is also inconsistent evidence concerning the relation between capital ratios and sales. As expected, the relation between ΔCAPITAL_RATIO and SALES is significantly negative during the crisis. However, the relation between CAPITAL_RATIO level and SALES is unexpectedly positive and statistically significant in both the pre-crisis and crisis periods, contrary to claims that low capital ratios cause firms to sell assets.
Determinants of selling: descriptive statistics
Panel C of
Determinants of selling: regression results
Determinants of selling: robustness tests
We consider several alternative specifications in order to check the robustness of our results. In order to determine whether the positive relation between SALES and OTTI is driven by the mere incidence of an OTTI charge rather than by the magnitude of the OTTI charge, we replace OTTI with an indicator variable capturing whether the firm takes an OTTI charge or not.
The To determine whether outliers drive the unexpectedly positive relation between SALES and CAPITAL_RATIO, we re-estimate regression (3) using ranks of all variables. Ranked FIRM_SIZE is highly collinear with the other ranked explanatory variables, so we remove it from the regression. The estimate of the coefficient on ranked CAPITAL_RATIO is not statistically different from zero in the pre-crisis or crisis-period regressions. The coefficient on ranked OTTI continues to be insignificant in the pre-crisis period and positive and significant (pvalue = 0.001) in the crisis period.
Finally, we re-estimate regression (3) with two subsets of the sample. First, we restrict the sample to observations with a non-zero level of SALES; inferences remain unchanged.
Second, we examine the sample of observations with non-zero levels of SALES and capital ratios below the median capital ratio; this sample is potentially interesting because bank stress factors such as earnings, bad debt expense, and OTTI may be relevant only when firms are less capitalized. For this sub-sample (contrary to the results for the full sample), no bank stress factor (CAPTIAL_RATIO, ΔCAPITAL_RATIO, EARNINGS, OTTI, and BDE) is statistically significant in the pre-crisis period or in the crisis period.
Realized gains and losses on sales of securities
In this sub-section, we examine the realized gains and losses on sales of AFS and HTM securities during the financial crisis. We do this for two reasons. First, even though we find that securities sales did not increase during the crisis, the fair value provisions of U.S. accounting The realized gains and losses are taken from items bhck3521 and bhck3196 on the Y-9C report. We add back OTTI charges because they are included in the items but are not actually realized.
statistically significantly higher than those in the pre-crisis quarters. Thus, industry-level net gains on sale provide no evidence of increased loss selling during the crisis.
[
PLACE FIGURE 5 HERE]
We also investigate the cross-sectional determinants of realized gains and losses (REALIZED_GL) to determine if bank stress factors such as low capital ratios prompt firms to engage in loss selling. The model is as follows:
Since REALIZED_GL is a proxy for pro-cyclical activity, most of the explanatory variables are the same as in the SALES regression model (model 3); the estimates of the coefficients are, however, expected to have the opposite signs. Also, since REALIZED_GL is a component of EARNINGS, we remove it from EARNINGS to create an explanatory variable called EARNINGS_GL. Further, we add a control variable called APPRECIATION, which is the beginning difference between the fair value and amortized cost of the AFS and HTM securities portfolio, scaled by average liabilities. If a bank is forced to sell particular securities at abnormally low prices, it may try to offset the negative impact on earnings and regulatory capital by selling other securities that have appreciated in value. We expect APPRECIATION to be positively related to REALIZED_GL because it captures the unrealized gains available to offset the effects of loss selling.
[PLACE TABLE 4 HERE] Table 4 presents coefficient estimates from regression (4). As expected, the estimated coefficient on the control for portfolio APPRECIATION is statistically significantly positive in both the pre-crisis and crisis period. No bank stress factors are statistically significantly related to REALIZED_GL in the predicted direction, except for CAPITAL_RATIO. However, CAPITAL_RATIO has a weak level of significance in the crisis period (the estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level in the 2007-2008 pooled regression and is not statistically significant in the 2008-only regression). As a robustness check, we re-estimate regression (4) after replacing the continuous OTTI variable with the OTTI indicator variable.
The explanatory power of the OTTI variable remains statistically insignificant. We also estimate the regression using just the observations with below-median CAPITAL_RATIO and all inferences are the same. The inconsistency and lack of significance in the relations between REALIZED_GL and the bank stress factors suggest that loss selling is not a common response to distress.
15
Interrelation of securities sales across firms; contagion effects
The last aspect of pro-cyclicality we examine is the cross-bank relations in selling behavior. Theoretical models predict that fair value accounting causes banks to respond to price shocks in uniform ways, creating volatile economic conditions (Plantin et al. 2008) . If banks' selling behavior in non-crisis periods is based on idiosyncratic liquidity needs or noise trading, we would expect to observe less cross-sectional variation in selling during crisis periods, as fair value losses force more and more banks to sell assets. Similarly, in crisis periods the industry level of selling should become a primary determinant of each individual bank's selling activity.
We compute the coefficient of variation (i.e., standard error/mean) for SALES in each quarter and plot this in 15 We speculate that accounting rules may have actually discouraged fire sales because the realized losses on sale would have reduced the capital ratio numerator, and thus in many cases would have reduced the overall capital ratio. Auditing practices may have also discouraged fire selling. Based on our conversations with auditors, sales of securities at a loss would be cause for questioning the bank's intent and ability to hold securities until prices recover, increasing the probability that the auditor would require OTTI charges on securities remaining in the portfolio. The basis for this auditing practice appears to be Auditing Standard AU 332, paragraph 57, which states that auditors should consider whether management's activities, such as securities selling, corroborate or conflict with stated intent. These incentives not to sell securities in times of falling prices would mean that accounting rules actually promote counter-cyclical behavior.
confirms that the coefficient of variation is statistically significantly higher in 2007 and 2008 than in the pre-crisis quarters.
[PLACE FIGURE 6 HERE]
The second way we examine the cross-bank relations in selling behavior is by adding industry-level quarterly sales (SALES_I) to the model of firm-level SALES (regression model 3). The presence of cross-bank inter-relations would suggest that SALES_I will be positively related to SALES, and we would expect the estimate of the coefficient on SALES_I to become significantly more positive during the crisis period. Table 5 shows that the estimate of the coefficient on SALES_I is significantly positive in the pre-crisis period. However, the estimate of the coefficient becomes insignificant in the crisis period, and is actually smaller in magnitude than the pre-crisis coefficient. 16 Inferences regarding SALES_I are robust to replacing a continuous OTTI variable with an OTTI indicator variable. Inferences also remain the same when restricting the sample to observations with below-median capital ratios and when requiring all observations to have non-zero sales. In summary, the evidence indicates that securities selling actually becomes less inter-related across banks during the crisis.
[PLACE 
V. Conclusion
Fair value provisions of U.S. accounting rules have been blamed for exacerbating the recent financial crisis, leading critics to call for substantial rule changes. Banking industry lobbyists and members of Congress pressed the FASB and SEC to change or suspend fair value accounting, and the FASB swiftly responded with changes. Defenders of U.S. rules argued that that the role of fair value accounting in U.S. bank regulation is not sufficient to lead to the pro-cyclical effects alleged by the critics, and are concerned about government interference in standard setting, normally a non-governmental activity.
We contribute to the debate over the role of fair value accounting in the recent crisis by examining the size and timing of OTTI charges relative to other non-fair value charges taken by banks. We focus on OTTI charges because they are the only fair value write-downs of debt securities that affect regulatory capital. We find that, although OTTI charges reached unprecedented levels during the financial crisis, the impact on regulatory capital was minimal.
Moreover, the majority of the OTTI charges were not recognized until the later part of 2008, well after the financial crisis was underway. Although we do find a relation between sales of securities and OTTI, suggesting a possible link between fair value accounting and pro-cyclical behavior, the preponderance of our evidence is inconsistent with pro-cyclical behavior.
Critics of fair value accounting also contend that it prompted banks to sell securities in order to maintain their regulatory capital ratios. Our results suggest that industry-level sales of AFS and HTM securities were similar to levels seen before the crisis. We also find no evidence that banks increasingly sold securities at losses during the crisis, providing no support for claims that fair value accounting caused -fire-sales‖ of assets. Based on our findings, it is unlikely that fair value accounting affected the banking industry in the ways commonly alleged by critics.
Rather, our evidence suggests that, if accounting-based depletions of regulatory capital played a role in the crisis, the main culprit was bad debt expense which is not a fair valued item.
It is important to understand the role that accounting rules played in the recent crisis because many critics, including a former FDIC chairman, pointed to the economic turmoil as evidence that the FASB needs more government oversight and checks on its standard setting power (Lamoreaux 2009; Isaac 2010) . This study's findings counter many of the claims about accounting's role in the crisis, which in turn suggests that Congress was rash in demanding rule 31 changes from the FASB. This should give pause to advocates of even more government involvement in accounting standard setting. An alternative way for the government to limit the FASB's influence over the financial sector is to delink regulatory capital rules from accounting rules. Even before the crisis, bank regulators shielded regulatory capital from several items affecting accounting book equity (e.g. unrealized gains/losses on AFS debt securities), and more exclusions could be made if systemic risk is a concern. OTTI is the amount of other-than-temporary impairments of available-for-sale and held-to-maturity securities. Bad debt expense is a charge related to management's expectations about future uncollectible loan amounts (bhck4230).
Earnings is the amount of net income (loss) (bhck4340). The sample is based on the top 100 banks ranked by beginning of quarter holdings of non-Treasury held-to-maturity and available-for-sale securities. All amounts are in billions.
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. Sales of AFS and HTM Securities by Quarter
Sales of available-for-sale and held-to-maturity securities are obtained from the statement of cash flows. The ‗constant sample size' plot is based on the top 100 banks ranked by beginning of quarter holdings of non-Treasury held-to-maturity and available-for-sale securities. The ‗constant sample firms' plot is based on the same 69 firms each quarter. To increase the number of firms that can be used, this plot does not start until 2005. The ‗scaled by average liabilities' plot is based on 2,685 firm-quarters and is the total amount of held-to-maturity and available-forsale securities sales, scaled by average liabilities. The left axis, in billions, applies to the ‗constant sample size' and ‗constant sample firms' plots while the right axis applies to ‗scaled by average liabilities' plot. 
Figure 5. Net Realized Gains and Losses on Sales of AFS and HTM Securities by Quarter
Net realized gains and losses from the sale of held-to-maturity and available-for-sale securities are obtained from Federal Reserve Y-9C items bhck3521 and bhck3196. We add back OTTI charges to these items to compute the gains/losses realized from actual sales. The ‗constant sample size' plot is based on the top 100 banks ranked by beginning of quarter holdings of non-Treasury held-to-maturity and available-for-sale securities. The ‗constant sample firms' plot is based on the same 121 firms each quarter. To increase the number of firms that can be used, this plot does not start until 2005. The ‗scaled by average liabilities' plot is based on 2,838 firm-quarters and is scaled by average liabilities. The left scale, in billions, applies to the ‗constant sample size' and ‗constant sample firms' plots while the right scale applies to ‗scaled by average liabilities' plot.
Figure 6. Coefficient of Variation in Sales of AFS and HTM Securities by Quarter
The coefficient of variation is the standard error of SALES divided by the mean of SALES each quarter. The sample is based on 2,685 firm-quarter observations. SALES equals the total amount of held-to-maturity and available-forsale securities sales, scaled by average liabilities. ***, **, * denote significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively (one-tailed if sign is in the predicted direction, two-tailed otherwise). The model is estimated using ordinary least squares. Standard errors are presented in parentheses below coefficient estimates. The quarterly regression uses heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (White 1980 ***, **, * denote significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively (one-tailed if sign is in the predicted direction, two-tailed otherwise). The model is estimated using ordinary least squares where the dependent variable is SALES. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are presented in parentheses below coefficient estimates. SALES equals the total amount of held-to-maturity and available-for-sale securities sales (from cash flow statement), scaled by average liabilities (bhck2948). SALES_I equals industry-wide sales of heldto-maturity and available-for-sale securities, scaled by industry-wide average liabilities (bhck2948). CAPITAL_RATIO equals the beginning Tier1 Capital Ratio (bhck7206). ∆CAPITAL_RATIO equals the change in the Tier1 Capital Ratio (bhck7206) during quarter q-1. EARNINGS equals pretax earnings (bhck4301) plus extraordinary items (bhck4320) minus other-than-temporary-impairments (OTTI) minus bad debt expense (bhck4230), scaled by average liabilities (bhck2948). OTTI equals other-than-temporary impairments of availablefor-sale and held-to-maturity securities, scaled by average liabilities (bhck2948). BDE equals the charge related to management's expectations about future uncollectible loan and lease amounts (bhck4230), scaled by average liabilities (bhck2948). CH_TREASURY equals the quarterly change in the amortized cost of held-to-maturity (bhck0211) and available-for-sale Treasury securities (bhck1286), scaled by average liabilities (bhck2948). PORTFOLIO_SIZE equals the beginning amortized cost of non-Treasury held-to-maturity and available-for-sale securities (bhck1754 + bhck1772 -bhck0211 -bhck1286), scaled by average liabilities (bhck2948). FIRM_SIZE equals the natural log of the average of total liabilities (bhck2948). All items beginning with -bhck‖ come from Federal Reserve Y-9C reports.
